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The data (and tabulations) used in this report were made 
available through the ESRC Data Archive. The data were 
originally collected by the Office for National Statistics Social 
Survey Division and funded by the Department for Work and 
Pensions, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, HM 
Revenue and Customs, Department for Communities and Local 
Government, Scottish Government, Financial Services Authority. 
Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Archive bear any 
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Wealth 
and Assets Survey, Waves 1-2, 2006-2010 [computer file]. 2nd 
Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 2012. 
SN: 7215 , http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7215-3
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Executive summary
The recent decision by the Office of National Statistics to 
undertake large-scale data collection on the distribution of 
household wealth in Britain has significant implications for 
public policy. 
We performed a cluster analysis of the latest publicly available 
wave of data1 which enabled us to construct a typology of British 
households according to their wealth position, as shown below: 
Type Description Households 
(million)
No assets Working age: no or low earnings, no 
or very low pension saving, renting so 
no property assets, in debt or minimal 
savings
3.5
Renter Working age: decent earnings but 
modest pension savings and no 
property assets
2.2
Debt burden Working age: late 20s to 40s, lower-
value home, significant mortgage (ltv 
75%), above median earnings, but 





Working age: low or no earnings, 
no or low pension savings, owner-





Working age: mainly 30s/40s, very 
good earnings, decent pension, 
middling value of property, mortgage 




Working age: 40s/50s, high-earnings, 
very good pension, high-value home, 
substantial progress in paying off 





Working age: mainly 50s/60s, higher-
value home, mortgage paid off, 





Working age: 60s (some 50s), higher-
value home, mortgage paid off or 





Pensioner: renting, no property assets, 
no or low pension assets, modest 
savings
1.9
Getting by Pensioner: older pensioner, above-
average property value, owned 
outright, modest pension, some 
savings
2.4
Silver success Pensioner: high-value home, owned 
outright, good pension, excellent 
savings, younger pensioners, some 
still working
2.5
1 There are three data points in this series, relating to information gathered in 2006-10, 
2008-10 and 2010-12. The detailed original data analysis in this paper uses the 2008-
10 information because the Office of National Statistics has not, at the time of writing, 
made the full 2010-12 data files publicly available. However the ONS kindly made 
sufficient information available privately to us from the latest data in order to satisfy 
us that the overall picture arising from the analysis performed for this report remains 
valid. And some high-level results are available from 2010-12, which are referenced 
in the text where appropriate. We will refresh the analysis in this report when the full 
datasets are publicly available.
We then explored ways in which this segmentation might be 
expected to change in future decades.
This analysis so far exposes a number of key questions that policy 
makers may wish to consider. In particular:
(1) Changes in longevity mean that households in Britain who 
receive inheritances tend to do so precisely when their 
wealth is already at its highest. This may be an opportunity 
to explore ways to incentivise the distribution of wealth 
more widely to younger family members whose need is 
greater, for example through taxing inheritance at receipt 
rather than bequest, building a deeper market for low-risk 
equity release products, and exploring pro-market ways to 
encourage intergenerational giving for specific purposes 
such as education, first-time buying and childcare costs.
(2)  There exists a significant cohort of people who own 
property but have a low income. These people are in a 
markedly different situation, having a degree of security 
and the possibility of realising their asset if needed, to 
those on a low income with no property assets. Yet this is 
not recognised in the benefit system - it is still possible to 
get low-income benefits if you live in a high-value home - 
or in discussions around income inequality.
(3)  Similarly, there exists a further significant cohort who 
have a relatively high income but a significant amount 
of household consumer (non-mortgage) debt. They have 
a greater financial vulnerability than would be presumed 
by looking at income alone; there may be a role for public 
policy to crystallise and support people in this situation to 
a greater extent. 
(4)  It is not possible to have a meaningful discussion of 
equality without discussing the housing market. At the 
moment, financial security is strongly linked to housing 
ownership, and the gap between those who have housing 
and those who do not is expected to widen: because 
housing is in limited supply and the returns on ownership 
are so great. 
This opens up a real policy choice. On the one hand a case 
could be made to discourage property ownership compared 
to other forms of investment to reduce speculative 
purchasing and encourage greater saving in support of 
the real economy. Tools to do so could include targeted 
taxation to incentivise a behavioural shift, new institutions 
and policies to guarantee security of tenure in other ways 
and proactive intervention to reduce the attractiveness of 
high-value areas and encourage investment in low value 
areas. 
On the other hand a case could simultaneously be made for 
measures to extend property ownership as far as possible, 
widening opportunity from the middle classes out and 
shrinking the group of people whose overall wealth
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position is constrained by the continuing need to pay 
for housing costs. That this choice exists is the proverbial 
elephant in the policy room when discussing distributional 
equity in Britain.
5)  For those who have pension assets, they are built up during 
working lives and drawn down in retirement. The imminent 
changes to the annuity market may alter the rate at which 
this happens. We expect a further segmentation in future 
years between (a) those who purchase an annuity at an 
early stage of retirement (b) those who seek greater control 
and save for longer as a precautionary measure leading to 
greater inheritances, and (c) those who decide to draw down 
more at an early stage and so rely on others as their age 
increases. 
Based on our analysis we make some policy recommendations for 
discussion, including:
• a shift to taxing inheritances at receipt, rather than at 
bequest, with a life-time allowance
• a re-introduction of asset-based welfare provisions to 
encourage life-time saving, including a consideration 
of savings schemes that pay out in tradable vouchers to 
support life events
• an equalisation of the taxation treatment between housing 
and other investment assets
• the creation of a “national housing bank” to promote 
equity release, long-term tenancies and mixed communities 
in high price areas 
• financial incentives for landlords to shift to offering 
longer-term tenancies
• reform of the council tax system to reduce tax on residency 
and increase tax on ownership 
• a supplementary charge on ownership as a regeneration 
tool, similar in concept as the existing varying rates of 
stamp duty but levied annually. It would be set at zero for 
low-value areas and a higher level in high-price areas to 
discourage speculative investment
• to support this, regular official house price valuations
• greater real-time data sharing to give vulnerable 
consumers access to their overall credit position.
The data analysis for this project was undertaken by Ashwin 
Kumar, who formerly headed the Model Development Unit at 
the Department for Work and Pensions (with responsibility for 
the Pensim2 model). He is now the chief economist at Tooley 
Street Research alongside his own consultancy firm, Liverpool 
Economics. The project was devised, written and managed 
by former Treasury Minister Kitty Ussher as a Smith Institute 
research fellow, who is also the managing director of Tooley 
Street Research. Paul Hunter is head of research at the Smith 
Institute.
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Introduction
This paper explores the implications for public policy from the 
new Office of National Statistics (ONS) data source on wealth 
distribution in Britain, and what we know about future trends in 
savings, longevity, property prices and inheritance. An earlier draft 
was discussed at a specially convened Smith Institute seminar in 
March 2014. This version incorporates insights gained from that 
discussion and also updates the analysis with the latest wave of 
data from the Wealth and Assets Survey that was published by 
the ONS In July 2014.
The case for having a greater policy emphasis on wealth - as 
opposed to simply focussing on income - is that a household’s 
wealth at a given point in time is often a better indicator of its 
economic wellbeing. The ONS has now made this point explicitly, 
stating in July 2014, that “it is important to consider both 
wealth and income when assessing the economic well-being of 
households”.2 Yet the policy implications are under-explored. 
For example, a person on a low income with significant savings 
living in a house that is owned mortgage-free faces very different 
economic constraints to someone on the same income with no 
assets to their name. Around 7% of people in the bottom 20% of 
income have property wealth worth over a quarter of a million 
pounds yet this is not taken into account when considering 
their eligibility for means-tested benefits.3 Conversely a person 
with an above-average salary with significant consumer debt 
(negative wealth) is in a very different position to someone on 
the same salary who is largely debt-free. The same data shows 
that while in the lowest income quintile, 24% of households have 
negative financial wealth, in the three middle income quintiles, 
the numbers are higher at 27%, 28% and 26% respectively.4 
It appears that the poorest are not necessarily the most debt 
vulnerable.
Of course the two measures are intrinsically linked: income is the 
measure of flow whereas wealth is a measure of stock, such that 
households who are able to sustain high incomes will have the 
opportunity to build up wealth. And having sufficient income to 
pay the bills on a day-to-day basis - whether it comes from work, 
or rent from assets owned - is a necessary condition for wellbeing. 




opens up opportunity and gives people freedom to take risks, to 
invest for the future, to buy time, and to give. And so without 
an explicit consideration of their distribution, governments are 
unable to achieve their stated goals, regardless of whether those 
goals are fundamentally egalitarian, paternalistic or libertarian.
Only when earnings are taken out of the equation, for example for 
people over retirement age, does the debate shift back to assets, 
as we worry whether sufficient savings have been accumulated 
to support a reasonable standard of living in retirement. We also 
use the language of assets when talking about non-financial 
capital where the relevant metric is the stock of the item in 
question rather than the flow, for example the skills and human 
capital of people, the social capital of communities, the strength 
of networks, the value of reputation and knowledge.
An exception is experimental forays into asset-based 
egalitarianism, or asset-based welfare, consisting of policy 
interventions designed to reduce asset inequality particularly 
around younger people. In Britain the now-abandoned child trust 
fund was a state-backed vehicle to enable more young people to 
be given a lump sum on reaching maturity. Individual learning 
accounts were another now-abandoned attempt to enable 
saving in order to invest in human capital.
There is scope for picking up on where the debate on asset-based 
welfare left off, to understand more about the distribution of 
assets in Britain and the forces that have led to that distribution, 
and so be better placed to understand how to build the type of 
economy that policy-makers want to see. 
This discussion paper attempts to start that conversation. 
Using the relatively recent data source of the Office of National 
Statistics Wealth and Assets Survey we describe the current 
distribution of assets in Britain. We then explore how this might 
be expected to change in future years given what we know about 
longevity, inheritance patterns and other demographic and 
policy changes. Finally we draw out implications for the public 
policy debate focussing primarily on intergenerational transfers 
including inheritance, as well as issues relating to housing and 
consumer debt. 
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Current wealth distribution
Figure 1: The age distribution of wealth
Source: ONS
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Figure 1 shows the typical lifetime distribution of these categories 
of the wealth distribution.
As can be seen, while the value of physical possessions remains 
roughly steady over a lifetime, people typically start to acquire 
some pension wealth in their late 20s, followed by property 
and then some cash balances building up from their 30s. The 
largest source of wealth accumulation over a person’s working 
life occurs by building up a private pension. This overtakes other 
forms of wealth by a person’s 40s rising to double property 
wealth on average by retirement. From retirement age, it is the 
pension wealth that is drawn down, with households on average 
usually choosing to keep their cash and property assets until the 
end of their lives. 
Figure 2, below, draws out these trends more starkly.
Current wealth distribution 
The ONS has since 2006 started to compile data on the net wealth 
position of households in Britain, which includes levels of all 
types of debt as well as assets. It takes two years to conduct the 
surveys required to obtain one data point and three data points 
are now available: for the years 2006-08, 2008-10, and 2010-12 
with headlines from the latter data published in July 2014. 
This Wealth and Assets Survey characterises four main 
components of wealth, as follows:
• net financial wealth for example cash in the bank, less 
consumer (ie non-mortgage) debts
• private pension wealth
• physical wealth, such as cars and personal possessions 
including valuable items
• property wealth for example value of homes less any 
outstanding mortgages
 
Figure 2: Wealth by age and category 
Source: ONS
Mean net financial wealth
Mean pension wealth
Mean physical wealth
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Note that this data, however, represents the mean value of each 
asset category for each age group. There are considerable variations 
within the mean value. For example, honing in on the distribution 
of net financial wealth shows that there are around 6 million 
households where the level of debt (excluding mortgages) is greater 
in value than cash savings. For people in this group who are earning, 
their disposable incomes are reduced by debt repayments. Those who 
are not earning are in a very vulnerable cash position. By contrast, 
there are a further 5 million people who have physical possessions, 
excluding property, that are worth over £60,000. So overall, while 
there are clear average trends by age, within each age category 
different households are experiencing very different pressures.
In order to tease out the range of values within the wealth 
distribution a little more, we separated out the position for each 
quintile, as shown in figures 3-7 below:
Figure 3: 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile points of the distribution of total wealth
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey Wave 2
Figure 4: 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile points of the distribution of pension wealth
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey Wave 2








15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+
Age








15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+
Age
(p 20) pensionwlth (p 40) pensionwlth (p 60) pensionwlth (p 80) pensionwlth
T H E  S M I T H  I N S T I T U T E
12
Figure 5: 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile points of the distribution of net financial wealth
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey Wave 2
Note: Net financial wealth includes financial assets (e.g. savings, investments) less non-mortgage borrowing (e.g. credit cards, loans).
Figure 6: 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile points of the distribution of physical wealth
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey Wave 2
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Looking at the overall wealth distribution, it is now possible to 
see, for example that households in the top 20% of the wealth 
distribution have built up assets worth around a million pounds 
by the time they retire, around ten times that of the bottom 20% 
of the overall wealth distribution (Figure 3). Looking at pension 
assets, the bottom 20% of households have built up less than 
£9,000 in pension wealth (or very roughly £9 per week in pension 
income) by the time they retire, compared to over half a million 
pounds in the pension pots of the wealthiest 20% of households 
(Figure 4). 
Turning to financial assets, the effect of consumer credit can now 
be seen more clearly: for 20% of the population, it’s not until 
they reach the age of 60 that their financial assets are worth 
more than their non-mortgage debts, and for the for the next 
20% of the population, - the 2nd quintile - it’s not until the age 
of 50 that their net financial assets exceed £1,000. The top 20% 
however tend to exceed this level of financial assets as teenagers 
(Figure 5).
The gap between the top 20% and the bottom 20% is lower 
for physical wealth than for other forms of wealth (Figure 
6), and amongst those with at least some property wealth, 
inequality is less extreme than in pension wealth: the big 
divide is between those with no property wealth and the rest 
(Figure 7).
There is also an important regional dimension to the accum-
ulation of property wealth. Analysis of the Understanding 
Society database by researchers at the University of Dundee
showed, for example, that in 2011, 42% of the housing wealth 
in England was located in either London (17%) or the South 
East (25%) which together form 32% of the population, 
compared to 20% of housing wealth in the Northern regions of 
England (3% of the total housing wealth in the North East, 7% 
in Yorkshire and Humberside and 10% in the North West) and 
15% in the East and West Midlands (6% and 9% respectively).5  
As a result, the returns to landlords able to invest where 
properties are rising are great. Research by estate agent Savills 
for the Financial Times newspaper demonstrated that “the vast 
bulk of the equity gains from Britain’s rising housing market 
over the past decade has gone to landlords and wealthier 
individuals who own their homes outright” with the value of 
housing owned by landlords rising from £384bn a decade ago 
to £818bn today.6 
A typology of wealth distribution in Britain
To gain a greater understanding of these differences, we used 
cluster analysis to tease out the common characteristics of 
different groups within the overall distribution. 
The variables that are taken into account are age, tenure status, 
property values, outstanding mortgage, pension wealth and 




6 “Homebuyers left behind in Britain’s two speed housing market”, Financial Times 14th 
January 2014
Figure 7: 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile points of the distribution of net property wealth
Source: Wealth and Assets Survey Wave 2
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Table 1: Typology of wealth
Type Description Households 
(million)
No assets Working age: no or low 
earnings, no or very low pension 
saving, renting so no property 
assets, in debt or minimal 
savings
3.5
Renter Working age: decent earnings 
but modest pension savings and 
no property assets
2.2
Debt burden Working age: late 20s to 40s, 
lower-value home, significant 
mortgage (ltv 75%), above 
median earnings, but modest 





Working age: low or no 
earnings, no or low pension 
savings, owner-occupier with 





Working age: mainly 30s/40s, 
very good earnings, decent 
pension, middling value of 
property, mortgage steadily 




Working age: 40s/50s, high-
earnings, very good pension, 
high-value home, substantial 






Working age: mainly 50s/60s, 
higher-value home, mortgage 





Working age: 60s (some 50s), 
higher-value home, mortgage 
paid off or nearly so, good 





Pensioner: renting, no property 
assets, no or low pension assets, 
modest savings
1.9
Getting by Pensioner: older pensioner, 
above-average property value, 
owned outright, modest 
pension, some savings
2.4
Silver success Pensioner: high-value home, 
owned outright, good pension, 
excellent savings, younger 
pensioners, some still working
2.5
Figure 8, below, then shows in graphical format how assets are 
distributed within each of these groups. It appears that there 
are several broad trajectories at work here. 
The largest group, comprising around 13.5 million households 
or a little over half the total, are either financially secure or 
are on a path to being so. In their 20s they will make up some 
of the “renters” group but by their 30s they are in the ‘good 
progress’ group, moving to becoming ‘wealth accumulators’ 
in their 40s, then either ‘looking forward to retirement’ or 
‘happily retired’ in their 50s and 60s before landing in the 
‘silver success’ group later on. This group does not need much 
in the way of state financial support.
A different trajectory comes to those who never manage to 
access property wealth and so spend the whole of their lives 
renting in some way or another. In working life this group is 
found in the “no assets” group which has very low incomes 
and/or high debts and so no way of saving. It also includes 
some people who are able to earn enough to save a little into 
a pension during their working lives - part of the “renters” 
group - but unlike others do not manage to convert this 
into home ownership in their 30s. In retirement, both these 
groups form the “renting in retirement group” where any 
small pension pot is drawn down, probably with state top-up 
support. This group consists of about 6 million households or 
a quarter of the total. 
Of a similar nature are the two million younger households 
whose financial debts mean that they find it harder to make 
the progress of other households their age. Cash-strapped by 
debt repayments they defer making pension contributions and 
build up property assets more slowly than other people in work 
at their age. Depending on how this situation resolves, this 
“debt burden” group may either end up renting in retirement 
or at the bottom end of the property-owning distribution.
Meanwhile there is another group who but for their ownership 
of property, would find themselves at the bottom of the pile. 
With little earnings to speak of they are unable to build a 
private pension but their ownership of their own home brings 
some security. In total this group makes up about a sixth of all 
households, broken down into 1.7m working-age households 
in the “relying on property” group and 2.4m pensioners in the 
“getting by” group. This group is also likely to rely on state 
support to meet their day-to-day needs. 
 
Inheritance
The ONS Wealth and Assets Survey also explores the 
contribution that patterns of inheritance make to the overall 
wealth distribution. Figure 9 shows the proportion of people 
in each group who in the 2008-10 survey had received an 
inheritance of over £1,000 in the previous two years. Figure 
10 then shows the relative size of these inheritances between 
the different groups.
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Figure 8: average wealth by component for each group
Figure 9: proportion of group who received an inheritance of at least £1K in previous two years
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Figure 10: average size of inheritance
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The key points to note are that on average people are most likely 
to receive a significant inheritance precisely at the stage of life 
when their wealth is already at its highest point, and that people 
who have already achieved a level of financial security are the 
ones that are most likely to receive a significant bequest. (An 
exception is the “relying on property group” whose property in 
question may well have come from a bequest.)
As a result, although the value of bequests is highest for the most 
affluent groups, the proportion of their total wealth that this 
represents is the lowest of all groups, as figures 12 and 13 show. 
These findings are consistent with prior work by the Institute of 
Fiscal Studies which showed that expected inheritances made 
little difference to the adequacy of retirement incomes.7
7 The adequacy of wealth amongst those approaching retirement, Institute for Fiscal 
Studies October 2012
Figure 12: Chance of receiving an inheritance in the last 2 years, by total wealth
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Drivers of future wealth distribution
In this second section we explore how the wealth distribution 
we have described might be expected to change in future years, 
given what we currently know, and as a result how the relative 
sizes of the groups described in the typology above might be 
expected to alter. We look in turn at private pension adequacy, 
home ownership, the property market, household debt and the 
pattern of inheritances.
Pension adequacy
It is now ten years since the Pension Commission considered 
the implications of rising longevity on incomes in retirement. 
Reporting in 2004 they stated that whereas in 1950 life expectancy 
on exit from the labour market was 11 years for men and 16 
years for women, this was expected to rise to 20 and 25 years 
respectively by 2005. In response to this analysis, governments 
have raised the state pension age and introduced legislation to 
auto-enrol employees into pension savings vehicles. However this 
followed a decade of declining membership of private pensions 
and even faster reductions in defined benefit pensions.8 
As a result it seems reasonable to assume that, in the short-term, 
the number of people who will accumulate some form of pension 
wealth will fall as the effects of reducing pension membership 
are seen. However this is likely to be followed by a rise in the 
accumulation of pension wealth as the effects of auto-enrolment 
feed through. We expect that the amount of pension wealth 
amongst the working-age lower income and renter groups to rise 
in the medium-to-long-term, and so the stock of pension assets 
amongst the “getting by” and “renting in retirement” pensioner 
groups to also be higher over time. 
Nevertheless, there is still a question mark as to whether this will 
be sufficient significantly to alleviate the burden on the state. 
Taking a definition of “adequate provision” as having an income in 
retirement of above the minimum state pension guarantee level 
(currently set at £142.70 per week for single people and £217.90 
for couples) then even despite these changes two-fifths of people 
aged 22 and over, or 11 million people, are currently not saving 
enough to ensure an adequate income in retirement according 
to the latest estimates from the DWP, although research by the 
IFS suggests that the proportion of people unable to achieve an 
adequate income in retirement without hitting the minimum 
income guarantee level falls to around one in five if housing and 
other forms of wealth are taken into account, and about one in 
ten if the imputed value from owning property outright and so 
not having to pay rent is included. The same research shows a 
clear fall in all measures of inadequacy as a result of the auto-
enrolment legislation.9 
A separate question arises as to how the ending of the requirement 
to purchase an annuity announced in Budget 2014 will affect the 
draw-down of income in retirement. The first point to note is 
that the policy will not affect all retirees but only those in defined
8 Office for National Statistics, Pension Trends, Chapter 7, 2013 Edition. See http://
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pensions/pension-trends/chapter-7--private-pension-scheme-
membership--2013-edition/sum-chapter-7.html
9 IFS op cit
contribution (DC) schemes, noting that for many DC pension-
holders there is already a high level of flexibility at the point 
of retirement. The previous legislation, for example, did not 
require the purchase of an annuity immediately on retirement 
but introduced a substantial tax penalty for not doing so by the 
age of 75, and did allow cash draw-down on retirement. The 
IFS estimates that around three-in-ten people currently aged 
between 55 and 59 will experience greater flexibility as a result of 
the budget changes, of which around two-thirds are men. Most 
of these people are homeowners with high levels of education 
who are in good health and have other liquid assets available, 
so are perhaps less likely to see the ending of a requirement to 
purchase an annuity as a windfall cash gain, although this may 
vary in time as DC schemes become more commonplace for 
people with smaller pension pots.10  
Related analysis by the IFS suggests that “perhaps lower income, 
but greater wealth, is the most likely outcome” in retirement for 
this group particularly if they want to maximise assets available to 
pass on to future generations.11 This is supported by the industry 
reaction following the Budget 2014 announcement: a survey 
by PwC suggested that the size of the annuities market could 
reduce by 75 per cent from £12bn to £3bn12; Legal and General 
suggested that the market would halve in 2014 and again in 
201513 and Friends Life Group said in May it was expecting a 50-
70 per cent decline in annuity sales.14 However the same analysis 
also suggests there will be a significant demand for other types of 
fixed-income products, perhaps preserving a greater proportion 
of the capital. Notwithstanding some concerns that this can 
lead to capital depletion and greater recourse to the state when 
people underestimate their life expectancy,15 overall we expect a 
shallower gradient to the decumulation of assets post retirement 
age in future and an accentuation of the inheritance effects 
mentioned above.
Home ownership and the property market
Having risen dramatically in the last hundred years, it appears as if 
property ownership has now peaked. Smith Institute calculations 
suggest it is likely to fall back from the current level of 67 per cent 
of households to 60 per cent by 2025, with the private rented 
sector taking up the slack. This is due to higher debts amongst 
the younger cohorts, more cautious lending policies on behalf 
of financial institutions, an expected increase in single-adult 
housing plus a polarisation in the real wage distribution making 
it harder for some people to get onto the housing ladder.16
In terms of our typology, this will mean that the absolute number 









15 see for example in Australia: http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1448&context=aabfj
16 The End of the Affair, Smith Institute June 2011
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will rise, and also that on average the proportion of wealth held 
as property in the “good progress” and “accumulator” groups will 
fall as households find it takes longer for them to get onto the 
property ladder.
Within the groups who do own property, the spread in the value 
of these assets will also widen as house prices in London and the 
South East continue to outstrip the rest of the country.17 London’s 
continuing attractiveness in the global marketplace, plus the 
number of jobs and higher salaries on offer in the capital, means 
that demand for property will continue to be higher than supply. So 
for those who do still own property, the location of that property 
will be ever-more critical to their household’s position on the wealth 
distribution, and for those that receive property as inheritances the 
location of the property will also have a big impact. 
Household debt
The proportion of households with consumer debts, outside of 
the mortgage sector, has remained steady at 50% since 2006-
08. But within this the composition of debt has changed slightly. 
Debts owed to the student loan company are rising slowly from 
a very low base - from 3% to 5% over the period. The proportion 
of households engaging in mail-order borrowing has also slowly 
fallen over the period, from 9% to 7% while those with credit 
card debt remains stable at about one in four. The proportion of 
households holding formal loans, which includes pay-day style 
loans, rose from 15% to 20% from 2006-08 to 2008-10 and then 
fell back to 18% in the most recent period, perhaps reflecting a 
fall in consumer attitude to risk before and after the recession.18 
Yet the value of these loans remains high: according to the Office 
of Fair Trading the value of payday loans rose from £900m in 
2008 to over £2bn three years later.19  
Within these figures however there is evidence that there is a 
minority whose personal debt position is becoming more extreme. 
The proportion of households who have negative financial assets 
of greater than £5,000 is growing, from around 9 per cent to 
12 per cent over the three waves of the survey, whereas the 
proportion of households with net debts between £500 and 
£5,000 is steady at 10 per cent. Expressed in a different way, for 
those with negative financial assets, the median value of the net 
debts has risen from £2,800 to £3,500 over the same period (a 
rise of 25%), whereas the upper quartile value has increased from 
£8,100 to £10,500 (nearly 30%).20  
Without regulatory action, there is little reason to think that the 
group of heavily indebted households will fall over time. As banks 
withdraw from riskier lending markets due to tougher capital 
requirements, web-based lending is on the rise making it easier 
for consumers to borrow at higher rates for impulsive purchases.21 
Acting against this are recent initiatives to bear down on 
irresponsible borrowing by the Financial Conduct Authority such 
as requiring payday lenders to re-register to higher standards, 
which has driven some out of the market, requiring all consumer 
17 The great house price divide, Smith Institute December 2013
18 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_362818.pdf
19 Office of Fair Trading press release 6 March 2013
20 ONS op cit
21 Tomorrow’s Borrowers, Smith Institute November 2013
credit lenders to determine whether the loan they are offering 
to the consumer is “affordable”, and moving towards a real-time 
database of consumer activity that allows a more holistic picture 
of an individual’s overall debt position to be established. However 
these changes have not yet reached a scale where they will alter 
substantially consumer behaviour. 
Without further policy action, therefore, this increasing prevalence 
of consumer debt is likely to polarise the wealth distribution 
further, making it harder for more people to accumulate assets. 
Given the link with indebtedness and youth, this will increase the 
age at which assets begin to accumulate: the peak of the graph 
will move to the right. 
Inheritance
Increasing longevity increases the age at which people can expect 
to receive inheritances whilst the tendency to have children later 
in life reduces it. Children born in 1981 were born on average to 
a mother aged 2722 who could expect to live for another 59.6 
years.23 Those born 30 years later had mothers aged on average 
29.7, who could expect to live for a further 60.5 years. 
So over that period, increasing longevity narrowly outpaced the 
delaying of childbirth. If this continues, we can expect to see 
gradual increases in the age at which people receive inheritances. 
Combined with political protection of housing as an asset in 
older age, housing and cash bequests to children will continue 
to be received at exactly the moment that they are least needed. 
The question is whether inheritances will be saved by the 
recently retired who are conscious of the need to maximise their 
precautionary savings as their earnings potential diminishes? 
Whilst there has been a dip in home ownership in recent years, 
this will probably not reduce the stock of property assets 
available for inheritance in the short-to-medium term but only 
in the long-term. So, for a period of time, the increases in home 
ownership seen over several decades will increase the property 
assets being passed on to the next generation, and widen the 
number of people who are likely to receive them.
However whilst receipt will be more widely spread, inequality in 
the value of assets is likely to increase. As earnings inequality has 
increased, the capacity to fund the acquisition of property has 
increased faster for some. At the same time, house price growth 
has been faster in some parts of the country. Both of these trends 
suggest that whilst more people will inherit property at all, a 
smaller number of people will receive much larger values.
This will be happening at the same time as grand-children and 
great-grandchildren will find it increasingly hard to get onto 
the housing ladder. An important question is whether people 
receiving inheritances at a time of their lives when they have 
little need of them will result in a change in bequest behaviour? 
Might we see a more substantial level of assets going straight to 
grand-children and great-grandchildren to help them get onto 
22 Office for National Statistics, Live Births in England and Wales by Characteristics of 
Mother 1, 2011
23 Office for National Statistics, 2012-based Expectation of Life, 1981-2062, Principal 
Projection, United Kingdom, December 2013
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the housing ladder?  If so, will likely increases in the inequality 
of the value of property assets transmit itself even more strongly 
onto future generations?
Conclusions
With the exception of pension savings, where policy intervention 
will make it more likely that people start to save earlier and so 
accumulate larger pension pots over their working lives, we 
expect the wealth distribution to polarise in future years. At the 
top end, the value of housing assets in London and the South 
East, plus the expected incidence of inheritance receipts, will 
push up the wealth of the already-wealthy, while at the bottom 
end the increasing prevalence of consumer credit and the 
receding prospect of home ownership particularly for single-
earner households will make it harder for others to accumulate 
assets.
T H E  S M I T H  I N S T I T U T E
23
Policy implications: Is investing in 
homeownership the best way forward?
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The policy implications that arise from the data analysis on 
the role of the housing market in wealth accumulation are 
particularly noteworthy. In the following section we discuss the 
most significant issues, such as: Is investing is housing optimal; 
and how can other asset classes be put on a level playing field 
with housing?
Investing in housing in the UK is something of a national 
obsession. From weekends spent on home improvements to the 
property pages of local papers, housing for many is not just a 
home but a primary (and in some cases, only) asset. However, 
for an increasing number of people buying a home is a distant 
dream. As our analysis of WAS data has shown particular groups 
are unable to buy a home, and therefore fail to acquire a housing 
asset during their working life. Due to the way the housing 
market currently functions, this also means that many excluded 
from owning face higher rents, which acts as a barrier to saving. 
There is also a significant spatial dimension to the split between 
the housing haves and have nots. Those in London and the 
South East who are homeowners are likely to reap the reward 
of high demand on a scarce resource, leaving a growing number 
of people in the capital excluded from this asset. The premium 
on homeownership and high rents for tenants also means fewer 
resources are available for other investments. For those in other 
regions homeownership may be more affordable but yields on the 
investment (and rents) have been much smaller than in London. 
These trends raise serious policy questions: is it sensible or optimal 
for housing as an asset to be preferred by policy makers over 
other asset classes? And, if not, what could be done to change 
this current preference and policy bias? 
Is investing in housing optimal?
Although housing alongside pensions is the preferred means of 
savings, policymakers rarely question whether this is optimal 
for the individual or for the country as a whole. Our politicians 
meanwhile continue to display a blindspot on the issue of housing 
wealth and how inequalities in an imperfect housing market lock 
in both national intra- and inter- generational inequalities. The 
political response to wealth accumulation in the housing market 
to date has been largely to ignore or deny problems that it brings, 
perhaps because of the fear of a virulent public backlash to some 
of the fiscal solutions on offer. 
There are a number of reasons why disinvestment in housing 
and investment in other assets might result in more optimal and 
equitable outcomes. 
i) GDP and investment
There is an opportunity cost to so much of household savings 
being tied up in property until death. If houses were not seen 
as such a good investment - because house prices did not rise 
over time, and the savings from not having to pay rent were 
so great - then that would make the prospect of investing in 
activities based on productive endeavour more attractive, or 
provide more of an incentive to generate wealth for retirement
through investing in one’s own skills and employment. By raising 
levels of innovation and productivity, both of these effects could 
increase the productive potential of the economy to a greater 
extent than the “wealth effect” increases in consumer spending 
amongst homeowners when house prices rise.24
ii) Public finances
The Mirrlees Review into the UK tax system (2010) argued that it is 
efficient to tax assets that rise in value faster than “normal” returns 
because doing so increases revenue without distorting behaviour. 
This would seem to apply to much of the higher end of the property 
market. Tax policy can also be used to equate supply and demand 
and so take the heat out of a rising market, which would affect 
the public finances in a positive way by raising revenue through 
taxing rising markets; and if it brought prices down reducing the 
level of government expenditure on housing-related services such 
as housing benefit. It could also be used as a macro-prudential 
tool to prevent asset-price bubbles, increasing the resilience of the 
economy and therefore the tax base as a whole. 
iii) Equality
Definitions of inequality vary. Insofar as access to financial 
resources increases opportunity in the economy to take risks and 
invest, it would seem there is a prima facie case for a shallower 
distribution of wealth. Since so much of the projected future 
inequality comes from the difference in the housing market 
in different parts of the country, it seems odd that people 
who happen to get on the housing ladder in one place rather 
than another should have such different outcomes. Whereas a 
generation ago, status in society depended crucially on school 
and education, in future it could well depend on access to the 
southern property market.
A fairer future: the case for shifting the policy bias away 
from housing as an asset
Investing in housing may therefore not be optimal or equitable. 
As we have shown the financial gap between those who have 
housing and those who do not is expected to widen. This is a 
problem because (a) as well as an investment asset, housing is 
also a social good in restricted supply yet (b) the strong financial 
returns that are often achieved through investing in housing 
make it more attractive than other asset classes, at least in some 
parts of the country.
This opens up a real policy (and political) choice. Should 
policymakers seek to make it less attractive to purchase housing 
and normalise life-long renting instead, or extend property 
ownership as widely as possible so that even more people 
can obtain the advantages from home ownership, spreading 
prosperity from the middle classes out and shrinking the group 
of people whose overall wealth position is constrained by the 
continuing need to pay for housing costs? 
Public policy for the last few decades has favoured the latter 
option. Policies such as right-to-buy, MIRAS and help-to-
24 See for example, Making Markets Work by Thomas Aubrey, Policy Network October 
2013
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buy have proved popular amongst families seeking the security 
and status of home ownership, as well as the windfall gains that 
can come from buying with a government subsidy and then 
selling in a rising market.
However on balance, taking a long-term sustainability perspective, 
there is much to be said for the former option. The possible prize 
on offer in the long term could be a situation where security at 
home is less dependent on ownership, where interest rates can be 
set with reference to the wider economy rather than the housing 
sector, where spare household cash is invested in other forms of 
assets in support of national wealth generation rather than being 
tied up in housing. And, where rents can be brought down to 
alleviate the taxpayer’s burgeoning housing benefit bill, and new 
policy tools established that could enable a government not only 
to bear down on speculative housing bubbles and support mixed 
communities in high-price areas but also, if it chooses, use the 
price of housing as a regeneration tool in low-price areas. 
Creating a level playing field?
How could the tax system and regulation make investment in 
other assets than housing a much more attractive proposition? A 
starting point for such a package is to make people indifferent as 
to whether they invest surplus income in housing assets or 
other classes of assets. The Mirrlees review of taxation proposes 
part of the solution, namely that any returns - including capital 
gains - on any asset that were above a “normal” rate, akin to the 
rate of return on a government bond, should be taxed at a far 
higher rate. If this included capital gains on primary residences it 
could (all things being equal) create a level playing field between 
housing and other assets. 
Introducing retrospective capital gains tax on primary residences 
is not desirable or politically possible. However a move to a 
Mirrlees-style system could be eased if: 
• there was reassurance that any past gains would not be 
taxed
• the baseline date for any future capital gains was pre-
announced and linked to a new valuation exercise
• the rate in question was highly progressive, so that most 
people were exempt, with this rate applying to all capital 
gains not just housing
• wider reforms to inheritance tax including shifting to 
taxation on receipt of bequests rather than on the estate as 
a whole (as outlined above)
However, this would require a valuation exercise that could 
take a number of years. Such a move is likely to prove politically 
difficult – since 1991 governments of all persuasions have 
chosen not revalue properties for council tax. Nevertheless, 
there arguably is a strong case to suggest that the changing 
property market demands that the property tax system is 
updated. Some of the objections could be lessened as suggested 
above by phasing the tax reforms and basing them on future 
rather than past gains. 
Even if the capital gains advantage of investing in (your own) 
property as compared to other classes of assets is removed, there
remain other reasons why investing in housing remains more 
attractive than, for example, shares or bonds. The first is control: 
if you own your home nobody can force you to move. The second 
is cashflow: paying off a mortgage dangles the potential prize 
of being able to live for free in your asset when there are no 
debts remaining, eliminating the need for housing expenditure 
in the future. The third is speculative: in some parts of the 
country at least, housing is in restricted supply, meaning that the 
anticipated capital gains may still be higher than for other asset 
classes. This makes housing a more lucrative investment even if 
the rate of taxation is equalised - and, of course, the more people 
who believe this to be true the more demand will rise: a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
Control: it could be an explicit policy aim to encourage long-
term tenancies, including those that can be included in 
inheritance bequests. This would mean there is more parity in 
security between the PRS and other two main tenures, which is 
particularly important given the increasing number of families 
living in the PRS. 
Rather than mandating for longer tenancies one possible 
solution is to make it attractive to landlords to cede long-term 
management of their properties to a regulated intermediary in 
return for a guaranteed stable income, linked perhaps to the 
best rates available on the money markets over time. Such an 
offer could be made attractive to landlords because of increased 
regulation which might demand more professional property 
management services. Moreover, the sort of tax changes set out 
below could make being a landlord that does not offer longer 
tenancies through an intermediary less financially attractive. 
Equity release and a national housing bank?
It should be easier to release housing equity without losing 
tenure: all homeowners and private landlords should know how 
to sell a proportion of their home either into a private market, or a 
government-backed agency - a “national housing bank” - in return 
for a charge taken against it.25 There are a number of occasions where 
this may be useful. It would help prevent people from getting into 
unsustainable debt situations if cashflow dries up. It would make it 
easier for intergenerational transfers without the older generation 
needing to face the disruption of leaving their home; at present 
while people in theory like the idea of equity release, in practice they 
find current provision “complex, risky and difficult to understand”26. 
The purchaser can structure the arrangement to protect their own 
position, for example ensuring they share in any capital uplift and/or 
use the capital released to arrange an income stream to be allocated 
accordingly between the lender and the owner/tenant. Given the 
timescales involved there may be a role for intermediation in the 
financial markets, with institutional investors potentially expressing 
an interest in acquiring bundles of housing assets released in this 
way. Alternatively the creation of a non-profit making “national 
housing bank”, to purchase all or parts of houses has considerable 
advantages, not least to ease intergenerational transfers. 
However, setting up a bank would face considerable challenges. 
Beyond the cost and time setting up the bank, it would need to
25 Professor Danny Dorling in All that is Solid (Allen Lane 2014) calls this a “right to sell”
26 JRF 2005 ibid.
speculation in some areas and encourage regeneration in others 
could ensure that the level of so-called council tax could be varied 
by geography to even out disparities in the market. The aim would 
be to disincentivise investment in wealthy areas and incentivise 
it in regeneration areas so as to act against the tendency of the 
market to produce the house-price bubbles that give windfall 
gains to owners and increases housing speculation. This may prove 
difficult to achieve through the housing market alone. Housing 
costs reflects the demand on a limited supply and is driven by 
the economic performance of the area. However, there is a case 
for trying to dampen the wide house price, and therefore wealth, 
disparities. In practice it would mean that council tax overall is set 
in strict proportion to house price value, including zero bands in 
low value areas.27  
The implication of these proposals are that there would have to be 
a national netting-off system between councils. This already exists 
to some extent in that local authorities already obtain a substantial 
proportion of the tax revenues from national government.
Area based taxes could prove highly controversial. At present there 
is a tendency amongst London’s media for example, to describe 
stamp duty as a ‘tax on London’. Moreover, there is greater emphasis 
on more devolution and, especially in London, to have more powers 
over taxes on housing to help build much needed homes. Any shift 
in taxes would need to be gradual, safeguarding those already on 
the lowest incomes in high demand areas, which would initially 
affect the efficacy of the tax. However over the longer term it could 
help to calm the worst excesses in the housing market. 
In summary, the basic elements of the new taxation system could 
be: 
• a residual (possibly much lower) charge on all residents paid 
to local authorities, with the usual means-tested exemptions.
• an ownership charge based on the value of the property 
owned, linked to regular valuations, collected by local 
authorities and paid to national government.
• a supplementary ownership charge based on the situation in 
the local housing market, set at zero for regeneration areas, 
and used as a countercyclical tool to temper the housing 
market in high-demand areas, collected by local authorities 
and paid to national government.
• redistribution from national government to local authorities 
depending on need through an equalisation formula similar 
to that currently in operation.
Taken together, introduced gradually, and adapted over time as 
the behavioural responses are understood, these tools could be 
sufficient to incentivise a shift from investing in housing over 
other forms of assets. Some of the proposals raise tax and reduce 
spending (for example on housing benefit), others will see reduced 
tax bills. However, the overall fiscal effect will depend on the 
details of the design and may not necessarily be either more or less 
expensive for the taxpayer.28 
27 Or indeed negative bands.
28 There are national accounting implications from the shift between capital holdings 
and current spending through the intermediary of a national housing bank, but these 
are not insurmountable.
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offer something which lenders currently do not. Whilst a national 
bank could overcome current problems around complexity and 
products being bespoke and small scale, there would be questions 
about whether products could be offered to those in low demand 
areas (where house prices are more volatile and lending more risky). 
Moreover if the long-term aim is to make housing a less attractive 
investment then a national housing bank could be left exposed if 
house prices fell. Another challenge would be that the national 
housing bank debts would be on the public finance balance 
sheet. This could change over time as was the case with Fannie 
Mae in the US (which was converted into a private corporation) 
but the national debt would constrain activity in the short term. 
Nevertheless activities could focus on particular types of lending 
which met the objective of reducing housing costs. 
If combined with the ability to sell all or part of the property in 
future - possibly to the same kind of national housing bank as 
described above - this could enable more tenancies to be offered to 
standardised longer terms whilst retaining the ability of landlords to 
extract their capital if needed by selling the tenancy at net present 
value. Making housing a less attractive investment could also help 
to reduce the price (and rental value) of housing. New provision 
of public housing would also become cheaper as land values fell). 
However it could reduce the supply of new private homes. 
The nearest equivalent to a regulated intermediary at present is 
where local authorities manage properties on behalf of private 
landlords, specialising in providing suitable properties for low 
income tenants. Such an institution would also prove valuable 
in ensuring some low-income families with links to expensive 
areas have the means of remaining in their neighbourhoods thus 
preserving mixed communities. However, this would depend 
on the ability either to reduce prices in high-demand areas or 
it would mean more subsidy from government. Moreover, a 
careful balance would need to be struck – if the rental stream 
was reduced dramatically or taxes raised too steeply then there 
would be fewer resources to invest in maintaining the housing 
stock.
 
Cashflow: Shifting away from taxing residency towards taxing 
ownership could over time provide an incentive for householders 
with spare cash to invest in assets other than housing; indeed 
the rate of the tax should be set to ensure this is the case. In the 
long-run the situation for those with cash to spare would be the 
same: the investments in other securities would yield an income 
that could cover living expenses including housing, but it would 
take the heat out of the housing market to the benefit of those 
with fewest assets or in lower demand areas. 
The role of the national housing bank (see above) would be crucial 
to ensure the tax was not simply passed on to tenants. Landlords, 
could be allowed an exemption from the tax if they sign a long-
term management contract with the new bank which could offer 
tenants longer leases and help reduce housing costs. 
Speculation: The principle of levying a form of council tax on 
the owners of a property, and not just those who live in it, is valid 
without prejudice to the rate at which that tax is set. However 
a progressive government that wishes to dampen property
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Other policy implications and ideas
There are no simple short term solutions to rectifying the wealth 
inequalities in the housing market. Moreover policy efforts to deal 
with housing wealth would need to be supplemented by other policy 
initiatives, not least around inheritance and savings. In addition 
reforms would be needed in regard to the consumer credit market. In 
particular, enabling people to take greater control of their finances. 
• Over time, government could encourage a transition to an 
inheritance tax system that taxes receipts rather than 
bequests. Those on lower incomes could have a generous life-
time, tax-free allowance for gifts and bequests. Such a change 
could incentivise a wider distribution of inheritances within 
families and lessen the effect of people inheriting just at the 
moment when their assets are greatest. There is evidence to 
suggest reform would be popular: inheritance tax in its current 
form is extremely unpopular even though very few people 
are affected.29 Taxing receipts rather than bequests would 
not support poorer families with no assets but could benefit 
some people on low-to-medium incomes. Such transfers could 
increase consumer spending. To mitigate the phasing effects 
on the Treasury’s coffers it could be combined with offsetting 
measures such as eliminating the forgiveness of capital gains 
tax on second properties on death, which has the perverse 
effect of encouraging hoarding of housing wealth.
• Government could re-introduce asset-based welfare 
provisions learning from the lessons of the scrapped child 
trust funds, individual learning accounts and savings gateway 
products from the period 1997-2010. In essence, markets 
should be encouraged to incentivise people to start saving as 
early as possible, with particular emphasis on low earners, and 
for particular purposes. Alongside incentivising greater cash 
savings amongst the young and/or low income groups, as part 
of this mix consideration should be given to creating bespoke 
retail financial products redeemed in the form of vouchers for 
specific purposes such as adult education, childcare vouchers 
or housing vouchers that would be attractive for older 
members of the family to invest in, in order to support future 
generations through challenging life stages. 
• The Financial Conduct Authority is currently making 
considerable efforts to re-regulate the market for 
consumer credit including putting a greater emphasis on 
affordability when products are offered. Individuals would be 
able to take more control of their finances by having more 
information about their overall financial solvency. This requires 
real-time information sharing including between public 
bodies (including housing and tax bodies), utilities and lending 
organisations so that problems are flagged up at an earlier 
stage giving people the opportunity to resolve them. There 
are data privacy implications, but regulators should be clear: 
access to credit should be denied if wide ranging and holistic 
credit checks cannot be undertaken.
29 Rowlingson, K and McKay, S; Attitudes to Inheritance in Britain, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (JRF) 2005
• One possible way to help more people to acquire a property 
asset could be the creation of the 100 year mortgage. Such 
mortgages have been introduced in Japan and Switzerland. 
Because of their length they had lower monthly repayments 
making homeownership more affordable at a time when prices 
were racing ahead of wages. While there were some attempts 
at introducing them in the UK in the mid-2000s they never 
became a mainstream product. Supporters argue that such 
mortgages could allow homeownership to be extended to 
those on lower incomes enabling them to put a foot on the 
housing ladder. The repayments would be cheaper than paying 
rents in the PRS and an asset could be accumulated over 
the longer term. This could offer another route to ownership 
similar to shared ownership, which research has shown 
to be in effect a tenure in itself with the vast majority not 
staircasing up to full ownership. 
However, these mortgages are not without their critics. 
The money repaid to the bank would be more than under a 
conventional mortgage (but it could offer better value than 
paying rent to landlord). A mortgage would need to be paid 
into retirement although households would still have to pay 
rent in retirement if they were not home owners. Perhaps, 
however, the biggest drawback (as highlighted in this section) 
is the tendency for speculation and bubbles in the housing 
market because of the fixed supply. One of the likely effects, if 
there was an appetite from lenders and the public (regulations 
permitting), would be to raise house prices as all potential 
buyers could afford to borrow more. 
Depending on the level of popularity it could help stoke-up a 
house price bubble, especially in already high-demand areas. 
If like Japan the market collapses homeowners could more 
easily find themselves in negative equity as more people 
would own smaller proportions of their homes. Recent 
moves away from risky lending practices such as interest only 
mortgages and higher deposits could ensure safeguards are 
in place. However, deposits are already the main, or at least 
initial, barrier to homeownership. And if house prices rose to 
even higher levels larger deposits would be needed further 
locking out those with small levels of savings. The end effect 
would be to suck even more capital into housing. One way 
to limit the possible inflationary effects would be to restrict 
the availability of mortgages to those on lower incomes for 
whom homeownership is just out of reach. Government, 
working with industry, could support such a move. This could 
help lower housing bills leaving money free to save and invest 
in non-housing assets. Alternatively, scaling-up the shared 
ownership market and making it function better could offer 
a solution. Lower deposits are required in shared ownership 
schemes. They are also less likely to ratchet up prices. However, 
increasing the number of shared ownership schemes and 
staircasing up remain challenging.
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